The Rehoboth
Project

The Durable Safety Field Brief

October 2026

Evidence and implications for building safer communities

New national analysis points beyond individual programs toward the workforce, relationships, coordination, and civic infrastructure that make effective intervention possible.

Colleagues,

Something important is changing in the national conversation about community violence intervention.

For years, the central question has been whether a particular program reduces shootings or changes outcomes for the people it serves. That question remains essential. But recent research and field analysis are pointing toward another:

What if the workforce, relationships, service pathways, coordinating structures, and institutional capacity surrounding a program are also part of the intervention?

A program may have a strong model and still struggle because its workers are unstable, its referrals lead nowhere, its data cannot follow participants across systems, its funding ends too quickly, or the institutions around it have never agreed on who is responsible for what.

The emerging evidence does not prove that an aligned ecosystem reduces violence. It does, however, make it increasingly difficult to evaluate programs as though they operate independently from the civic infrastructure around them.

Three recent developments help clarify what is at stake.

In October, the Council on Criminal Justice released an assessment of the historic decline in homicide since 2022. The organization convened 48 researchers from criminology, economics, public health, sociology, and related fields to consider nearly 50 possible explanations.

48researchers convened
91%saw CVI as a major or limited contributor
64%ranked it among the leading contributors

That is significant expert agreement. It is not causal proof.

The underlying evidence remains mixed. A randomized trial in Denver found reductions in violent offending among participants. Studies in Baltimore produced promising but uneven results. Evaluations in Washington, D.C., found no reduction in gun violence associated with some programs, including one neighborhood where gun homicide increased.

The responsible conclusion is not that CVI caused the national homicide decline. It is that CVI has become a credible part of the explanation, and that the field now needs better evidence about where, how, and under what conditions it contributes to safety.

Andrew Papachristos’s companion brief makes a deeper observation about what happened after 2020.

CVI did not simply grow in size. In some cities, it began to develop the characteristics of a more durable field:

Papachristos describes this as the developing “connective tissue” of civilian public-safety infrastructure.

That idea deserves careful attention. If communities achieved better results where they built stronger organizations, more stable workforces, deeper relationships, coordinated coverage, and more capable service networks, then conventional program evaluation may be missing part of what produced the outcome.

The report does not establish that this infrastructure caused the decline. In fact, it explains why the causal question remains difficult to answer: the country lacks standardized, longitudinal information about CVI investment, geographic coverage, participant dosage, workforce stability, implementation quality, and organizational capacity.

We know much more about where shootings occurred than about the intervention systems that were built in response.

A new landscape analysis commissioned by Columbia, Missouri, offers a useful local counterpoint.

21community organizations convened
14organizations and coalitions interviewed

The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform convened 21 community organizations and interviewed representatives from 14 organizations and coalitions. The analysis found substantial prevention, reentry, recovery, basic-needs, and community development activity.

Yet Columbia still had limited capacity to reach people at the highest immediate risk of gun violence.

Some trusted residents were already conducting outreach without formal positions, compensation, supervision, or organizational support. Victim services, hospital-based intervention, school-based violence interruption, and structured street outreach remained underdeveloped.

The problem was not an absence of committed people or useful organizations. It was a mismatch between existing capacity and the functions required to reach those at greatest risk.

The report also found that funding requirements can shape whom organizations serve. Providers may pursue grants designed for broadly at-risk populations even when local violence patterns require a more intensive focus. Repetitive intake and reporting requirements can further discourage participation or re-traumatize residents already reluctant to engage.

This is descriptive analysis, not an evaluation of outcomes. But it exposes a critical distinction:

A collection of organizations is not necessarily an ecosystem, and an ecosystem of broadly beneficial services is not necessarily an intervention system.

Taken together, these reports make the evidence gap more precise. It is no longer enough to ask whether a city funds CVI or whether a program exists. We need to know:

These are not secondary administrative questions. They may help explain why similar programs produce different results in different places.

The field also needs stronger comparative research. Researchers should document where CVI operates, when it began, what was actually implemented, how intensively people were served, and what supporting infrastructure existed. Communities with different levels of coverage, coordination, and organizational capacity could then be compared while accounting for prior violence trends and other local conditions.

Without that information, even a well-designed evaluation may tell us only whether a largely undefined package worked in a particular place.

Cities do not need to wait for perfect evidence before improving the conditions around their programs.

They can begin by mapping essential functions rather than merely listing organizations. Who is responsible for street outreach, hospital response, victim support, youth intervention, trauma recovery, reentry, employment, behavioral health, and family stabilization? Where are the gaps? Where is responsibility duplicated or unassigned?

Funders can examine whether their requirements strengthen or fragment the ecosystem. Short grants, burdensome reimbursement processes, narrow eligibility rules, and incompatible reporting systems can weaken the very organizations they are intended to support.

Evaluators can document implementation before attempting to explain outcomes. Reach, dosage, relationship continuity, workforce stability, referral completion, geographic coverage, and participant experience should be treated as central measures.

Community leaders should have authority not only to advise programs, but to interpret evidence, identify gaps, establish priorities, and hold institutions accountable for their part of the work.

And coordinating offices must be judged by what coordination produces: clearer responsibilities, better coverage, functioning referral pathways, shared measures, fewer barriers for residents, and sustained public investment.

The September brief argued that the program is not the ecosystem.

The October evidence allows us to go further:

The ecosystem may not simply support the intervention. Its relationships, workforce, service pathways, institutional commitments, and community authority may be part of how the intervention works.

That proposition still requires rigorous testing. We should not present it as settled science.

But it gives the field a stronger question than whether one more program should be launched.

The next task is to identify which forms of infrastructure improve reach, continuity, implementation, and outcomes, and which structures merely create the appearance of coordination.

This question sits at the center of my ongoing Durable Safety work, but it belongs to the field. No single organization or framework can answer it alone.

Programs may interrupt violence. Only aligned civic systems can sustain peace.

I welcome your reflections, disagreement, and examples, especially from communities already building this infrastructure in ways our current evaluations may not yet recognize.

In solidarity,

Durable Sustainability Strategies Exist

If the thesis of this brief is right—that workforce stability, coordination, and institutional capacity are part of the intervention—then funding strategy belongs on that same list. An aligned ecosystem cannot run on single-year grants and one relationship at a time. It needs a diversified, mapped revenue base that can survive a funding cycle, a change in city leadership, or a program’s natural maturation.

That is the problem Revenue Mapping was built to solve. Over a focused 90-day engagement, we assess an organization’s current funding posture, research the full landscape of public, philanthropic, and corporate capital available to its specific model of work, and deliver a qualified prospect database—a working, prioritized list of funders, partners, and public dollars matched to that organization’s actual programs, geography, and stage of growth. The result is not a generic grant list. It is a map an organization’s leadership can act on immediately and keep building from.

The Durable Safety work itself is the clearest case study available. The Rehoboth Project was not simply looking for its next grant; it was building civic infrastructure, leadership, relationships, and community power that needed a financial strategy equal to that vision. Revenue Mapping translated that vision into a Strategic Revenue and Funding Roadmap—a practical, diversified path from individual engagements toward long-term institutional sustainability.

“James Braxton’s Strategic Revenue and Funding Roadmap is an incredibly valuable tool for me and the future of The Rehoboth Project. What I especially appreciate is that James understood the larger vision of our work. He recognized that we’re not simply building programs; we’re building the civic infrastructure, leadership, relationships, and community power necessary to sustain meaningful change. The roadmap takes that vision and translates it into a practical, diversified revenue strategy that can help us move from promising ideas and individual engagements toward long-term institutional sustainability. For someone who has spent decades building power and developing leaders, having a strategy that connects the mission to a viable financial future is both affirming and enormously useful. James has given us something we can build from.”

— Juard Barnes, Principal & Founder, The Rehoboth Project

For CVI and Community Health Worker organizations wrestling with the question this brief raises—whether infrastructure survives after temporary funding ends—Revenue Mapping is one answer: know your full universe of funders before the current grant runs out.

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James E. Braxton II  |  Founder & Revenue Mapping Strategist  |  [james.e.braxtonii@gmail.com](mailto:james.e.braxtonii@gmail.com "mailto:james.e.braxtonii@gmail.com")  |  540.748.7373